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Elevating design in the organization 
 
Abstract  
Following evidence of its positive contribution to innovation and company performance, 
many firms are seeking to elevate design to a strategic level. However, little is known as to 
how this can be achieved. This study draws on the literatures concerned with elevating 
organizational functions and with organizational legitimacy, and aims to unravel and detail 
critical practices and potential tensions influencing the elevation of design’s status in firms. 
To do so, 53 in-depth interviews were undertaken with key informants, representing a range 
of functional specialisms, in 12 companies, including large multinational companies as well 
as SMEs. Findings show how six practices – top management support, leadership of the 
design function, generating awareness of design’s role and contribution, inter-functional 
coordination, evaluation of design, and formalization of product and service development 
processes – affect the design elevation process. In contrast with previous studies on raising 
the status of organizational functions, this research reveals that the same practive can play 
both positive and negative roles, and that there are fundamental tensions, which should be 
reconciled if design’s status is to be elevated. Drawing on the concept of organizational 
legitimacy, we also examine how design moves beyond being seen as pragmatically useful, to 
being identified as a relevant, alternative way of operating, to being regarded as essential for 
success. The article concludes by articulating contributions to design and innovation 
management theory and practice, and to the body of scholarly work seeking to understand 
how to elevate the status of a function. 
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Introduction  
Design is a primary driver of innovation in both manufacturing and services (Luchs, Swan, 
and Creusen, 2016; Ostrom, Parasuraman, Bowen, Patricio, and Voss, 2015; Verganti, 2009). 
It is critical to differentiation and branding (Noble and Kumar, 2010), and positively affects 
companies’ financial and non-financial performance (Gemser, Candi, and van den Ende, 
2011; Ravasi and Stigliani, 2012). The business press is rife with examples – from BMW to 
PepsiCo, from Herman Miller to Nike – of design’s significant role in achieving these 
outcomes, specifically by elevating the design function to a strategic level within the firm 
(Bangle, 2001; Borja de Mozota, 2003; Brown, 2008; Verganti, 2009). As former chairman 
and CEO of Procter & Gamble, A.G. Lafley, stated: 
“Historically, P&G was brand- and product-centric. [More recently] we have used 
design to take a different cut at strategy and organizational planning to do things 
differently and better. [To do so] we worked hard to grow and develop the design 
team—gave them time to grow capabilities, gain experience, and prove their value to 
the product and brand teams.” (Lafley, Norman, Brown, and Martin, 2013; p. 5).  
 
Design’s strategic significance is being noticed and acted upon. In recent years 
Accenture acquired service design firm Fjord; the Chinese communication group Blue Focus 
bought a majority stake in US-based agency Fuseproject; bank holding company Capital One 
acquired user experience consultancy Adaptive Path; and McKinsey bought product design 
agency Lunar. Also, companies such as Johnson & Johnson, PepsiCo and Philips have 
appointed lead designers to their boards (Gardien and Gilsing, 2013; Stuhl, 2014). The 
success of design-led firms such as Apple (the world’s most profitable company and most 
valuable brand in 2017), along with recent debates on design thinking, bring to the fore a 
long tradition of attempting to elevate design to a strategic level (Beverland and Farrelly, 
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2007; Borja de Mozota, 2003; Cooper and Junginger, 2011; Gorb, 1990; Noble, 2011). 
Drawing on the literature (Karjalainen and Snelders, 2010; Luchs et al., 2016) and on the 
empirical research reported in this article, we define “strategic design” as designers’ ability to 
influence decisions and set direction over issues that affect the long-term sustainability and 
competitiveness of an organization, such as development and communication of a brand’s 
core values, positioning, and creation of new markets. 
However, how can design be elevated from a functional to a strategic role within the 
firm? Extant research highlights the need to elevate design (Luchs et al., 2016; Roper, 
Micheli, Love, and Vahter, 2016) for two main reasons: (1) strategic issues such as branding, 
innovation, and differentiation benefit from design input, and (2) designers have methods that 
can bring unique insights to strategy formation and implementation (Best, Kootstra, and 
Murphy, 2010; Brown, 2008). Yet, little is actually known about the ways in which this could 
be achieved (Micheli, Jaina, Goffin, Lemke, and Verganti, 2012; Noble, 2011). This gap is 
reflected in research priorities concerned with infusing design into organizational processes, 
including those of the Marketing Science Institute 2016-2018 (MSI, 2016), Journal of 
Product Innovation Management (Biemans and Langerak, 2015), and Journal of Service 
Research (Ostrom et al., 2015).  
This study investigates how to elevate the status of the design function. It aims to 
contribute to current bodies of literature seeking to understand how to elevate the internal 
status of an organizational function and draws on organizational legitimacy theory to do so. A 
function’s status is defined as its ability to exert power and influence over decision-making 
beyond task-related issues (Enz, 1988; Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, and Pennings, 1971; 
Pfeffer, 1981). Higher status has three core benefits: sustained resource attraction, authority 
over other functions, and influence over top management team attention and strategy making 
(Feng, Morgan, and Rego, 2015; Kahn, 2005). In line with organizational theorists, we 
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contend that obtaining legitimacy is essential to realizing such benefits. Legitimacy is 
essentially concerned with ensuring access to resources (Bitektine and Haack, 2015) and 
informs and provides the theoretical framing for this study. Specifically, three questions 
direct our inquiry: (1) which practices underpin the elevation of design’s status within the 
firm? (2) Are there tensions related to the identified practices that may inhibit the elevation 
of design and how are they managed? (3) How do the elevation practices relate to seeking 
and acquiring legitimacy? 
Drawing on an exploratory multiple case study, we contribute to design and 
innovation management theory and practice in four main ways. First, this research extends 
findings drawn in relation to other functional disciplines and proposes further practices that 
enable the elevation of a function’s status. Second, by unraveling tensions in the elevation 
practices, it empirically contributes to enduring debates in the innovation management 
literature on conflict between formalization and creativity, and between control and 
adaptability. Third, by considering the elevation of design as the acquisition of legitimacy, 
this study shows not only how to attain pragmatic legitimacy, which draws on calculative 
arguments, but also how higher levels of legitimacy – moral and cognitive – could be 
achieved. Fourth, given recent interest in a strategic role for design, this research provides 
empirical evidence specifically on how to elevate design’s status in organizations. 
 
Literature Review 
The elevation of design within the firm  
Since Herbert Simon (1969) identified the unique ways in which designers approach problem 
solving, researchers have explored how design can contribute to an organization’s 
competiveness. One group of advocates for design’s strategic role draws on design 
effectiveness studies (Hertenstein, Platt and Veryzer, 2005; Luchs et al., 2016). Research 
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shows that design’s contributions can go beyond traditional aesthetics to include emotional 
and functional attributes of products and services (Gemser et al., 2011), as well as workplace 
design, communications activities to the firm’s myriad of stakeholders, and corporate identity 
development (Borja de Mozota, 2003; Gorb, 1990). Given design’s potential impact on such 
a wide set of aspects, various authors have argued that its status should be elevated to the 
level of other functions such as marketing, R&D and operations (Roper et al., 2016). 
Another argument for increasing design’s status draws on the unique insights that the 
methods of design bring to the strategy-making process per se (Chung and Kim, 2011; 
Cooper and Junginger, 2011; Martin, 2009). This point of view focuses less on the breadth of 
activities where design can add value, in favor of the unique perspectives designers bring to 
strategic management, sometimes referred to as “design thinking” (Brown 2008; Liedtka, 
2015). Methods associated with design thinking, for example, can address tricky issues in 
strategic brand management, such as balancing renewal and reinforcement through new 
product development (NPD) (Beverland, Wilner, and Micheli, 2015).  
According to this approach, the elevation of design’s status helps infuse a stronger 
focus on the future and disrupt accepted marketplace norms. Design follows a constructivist 
logic focused on conception, invention, pattern creation, staging and sensemaking that 
complements business’ positivist logic (Borja de Mozota, 2003; p. 146). Here design seeks to 
challenge long held assumptions and synthesize existing firm capabilities with emergent 
opportunities (Beverland et al., 2015). Moreover, authors have emphasized design’s 
distinctiveness from natural and social sciences, because of its capacity to question current 
states, conceive what does not exist and, therefore, be particularly suitable to address “wicked” 
problems (Buchanan, 1992; Martin, 2009). Design can also act as an integrating mechanism, 
bringing together seemingly conflicting functional preferences in addressing NPD problems 
(Micheli et al., 2012). Specifically, designers can bring a complementary set of practices 
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focused on validity (rather than reliability) (Martin, 2009) or on ‘shape’ (rather than ‘fit’) that 
are both essential to NPD success (Beverland, Micheli, and Farrelly, 2016).  
 
Elevating an organizational function’s status 
Research on raising the status of a function is relatively rare. Although there is a wealth of 
knowledge on how to create a certain orientation – such as market, business process, and 
supply chain orientations (Gebhardt, Carpenter, and Sherry Jr., 2006; Lockamy and 
McCormack, 2004; Mentzer, 2001) - little is known about how organizational functions can 
be elevated to a strategic level. Likewise, studies on intra-organizational power have focused 
on the antecedents and benefits of higher status (Enz, 1988; Feng et al., 2015; Welbourne and 
Trevor, 2000), but have not empirically investigated how such elevation is attained.  
Yet, scholars and practitioners, especially within the disciplines of human resource 
(HR) management and marketing, have called for an enhanced strategic role for their 
functions, drawing on similar arguments to those put forward for design. For example, there 
is an appeal for HR issues to be addressed by top management teams and for HR 
professionals to influence strategic decisions (Jackson, Schuler and Jiang, 2014). In 
marketing, although rare, arguments for raising the function’s status are based on 
demonstrating its importance to performance outcomes (Feng et al., 2015; Homburg, 
Vomburg, Enke and Grimm, 2015). Indeed, both disciplines lament their declining internal 
status despite their influence on performance related outcomes (Homburg et al., 2015; 
Jackson et al., 2014). 
Notwithstanding calls for further research, only a few studies have examined how the 
status of either HR or marketing could be elevated. Two main related issues have been 
identified: alignment with organizational goals, and internal image. As to the former, authors 
have speculated that HR’s predilection towards flexibility may be at odds with the pursuit of 
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control and standardization of efficiency-driven organizations (Ulrich, Younger and 
Brockbank, 2008). Homburg et al. (2015) also posit that the lack of CEOs with a marketing 
background may also lead to misalignment. Alignment is critical since top management 
team’s perceptions of value congruity (i.e., the extent to which the top management team 
perceives functional heads to share their strategic goals) are critical to enhanced functional 
power and internal status (Enz, 1988). This lack of alignment is also driven by poor internal 
image. For example, Homburg et al. (2015) speculate that lower status is a function of an 
inability to communicate value-adding activities, indirect relationships between activities and 
outcomes, the poor quantification of marketing effectiveness, and poor message framing.  
Similar themes have been suggested in relation to raising the internal status of design. 
For example, managers often lack appreciation of design (Song et al., 1997), designers may 
have different mental models than other functional experts’ (Micheli et al., 2012), and 
designers struggle to measure and account for their contribution to organizational 
performance (Lockwood, 2007). However, such ideas are frequently construed as outcomes 
or states, rather than practices introduced by employees, such as designers and managers. 
Hence, although scholars proffer typologies identifying an extended strategic role for design 
(Best et al., 2010), and practitioners advocate a more strategic role for the design function 
(Brown, 2009), little is known regarding which practices help elevate design’s internal status 
(Luchs et al., 2016; Ravasi and Stigliani, 2012). Therefore, in this study we focus on 
unraveling those organizational practices - defined as routinized and repeated sets of 
activities performed by organizational actors - which are critical to design’s status elevation. 
This leads to our first research question:  
 
1. Which practices underpin the elevation of design’s status within the firm? 
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A related, but unexplored question is whether tensions emerge within the elevation process: 
are the practices necessarily playing a positive role? For example, some scholars have 
speculated that strong top management support is required to elevate a function’s status 
(Webster, 2005), but is such support inevitably conducive to design acquiring higher status? 
Also, new product development (NPD) research has long stressed the need to plan and 
structure disciplined and formalized processes, alongside the need to support the conflicting 
demands of experimentation, boundary spanning and novelty (Bruce, Daly, and Kahn, 2007; 
Gilson, Mathieu, Shalley, and Ruddy, 2005). However, the two have often been regarded in 
opposition; for example, while controlling a function can enhance timely project completion, 
it can also limit problem solving and creativity (Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011). Therefore, 
the decision to formalize processes and systems to promote a more strategic use of design 
could either result in elevating its status, as intended, or, on the contrary, in limiting its scope 
and influence. Hence, we seek to unpick such tensions by exploring the way elevation 
practices are implemented and investigating how they are managed. This leads to our second 
research question: 
 
2. Are there tensions related to the identified practices that may inhibit the 
elevation of design, and how are they managed? 
 
Legitimacy and Functional Status 
In this article we utilize the concept of organizational legitimacy to make sense of the way 
practices operate to elevate design’s status. Organizational theory scholars have emphasized 
that obtaining legitimacy is essential for any entity (be it an organization or a function) to 
ensure access to resources (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
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are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p.574). Specifically, Suchman (1995) 
identifies three primary forms of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral, and cognitive. The first is a 
rational kind of legitimacy that “rests on the self-interested calculations of an entity’s most 
immediate audiences” (Suchman, 1995: 578). The second involves questions of values and 
beliefs about how to best operate (Thomas and Lahm, 2012). The third, cognitive legitimacy, 
means that an entity’s capacity to create value is taken-for-granted and it is considered a 
necessary part within a socially constructed environment (Tost, 2011). 
 When studying how organizational entities acquire legitimacy, scholars have tended 
to adopt two different perspectives - strategic and institutional (Suchman, 1995). In this study 
we focus on intra-organizational dynamics and consider legitimacy from a strategic point of 
view, i.e., legitimacy can be purposefully acquired and manipulated within the firm by 
employing appropriate practices, rituals and symbolisms (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). 
Such intra-organizational legitimacy has recently garnered much attention (Ashworth, 
Harrison and Corley, 2008; Drori and Honig, 2013). For example, Bunduchi (2017) focuses 
on the tactics through which innovation managers ensure ongoing support for their initiatives 
with other business units. She finds that ongoing support for innovation initiatives requires 
moving beyond short-term calculative, rational appeals about the benefit of a particular 
project (consistent with pragmatic legitimacy) to include normative beliefs about how best to 
operate and enshrine innovation into the identity or fabric of the firm (i.e., moral and 
cognitive legitimacy). To do so, Bunduchi, along with Galang and Ferris (1997), emphasizes 
that symbolic impression management practices targeted at stakeholders are essential to 
achieving lasting legitimacy and therefore elevating functional status.  
 In summary, from a legitimacy point of view, arguments put forth in the literature for 
the elevation of design can be regarded as primarily pragmatic: employing design 
 11 
strategically can lead to better outcomes and more innovative solutions to enduring 
challenges. In contrast, researchers examining internal legitimacy and the elevation of 
functional status suggest there are limits to this approach, and highlight the need to propose 
moral and cognitive legitimacy arguments that relate to how organizational actors operate, 
but have not investigated specific practices and potential tensions related to this. 
 This gives rise to the third research question: 
 
3. How do the elevation practices relate to seeking and acquiring legitimacy? 
 
Methodology 
Sampling and data collection 
A qualitative, multiple case study method was chosen to address the three research questions. 
Case study research provides rich data and is suitable for investigating deep processes that 
emerge and change over time (Bluhm, Harman, Lee and Mitchell, 2011), and multiple case 
studies allow for rigor in identifying patterns across the data (Eisenhardt, 1989). Given the 
focus on elevating a function, the sampling strategy was both theoretically driven and aimed 
at achieving maximum variation (Patton, 1990). In so doing, we sampled firms based in the 
United Kingdom that were of different sizes, yet large enough to have functional structures 
(including a separate design department). These firms operate in sectors where design would 
be commonly expected to play a major role (e.g., furniture and automotive) and in sectors 
where it would not (e.g., financial services and logistics). Interviewees confirmed the role 
that design was playing in their industry. For example, the chief design officer of Company 
C, a large financial services firm stated: “the future of the financial services industry all 
comes down to design and … starting all over, because our industry, as we know it now, will 
not be the same in three years’ time, five years’ time, ten years’ time. It will be an entirely 
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different industry.” The choice of involving different companies was motivated by our quest 
to identify practices and potentially related tensions that were neither industry-specific nor 
related to the degree of embeddedness of design in a particular sector. 
In the case sampling stage, key informants, namely designers working in various 
firms, design experts and consultants, were contacted. Publicly available documentation 
(including annual reports, trade magazine articles and design awards) was also gathered in 
relation to several organizations’ prevalent use of design. This stage resulted in identifying 
and gaining access to 14 private companies. Data gathered from the key informants provided 
initial evidence that all chosen organizations had considered utilizing design not simply in a 
functional way but were explicitly endeavoring to either elevate it to a more strategic role or 
to sustain it. Following initial interviews at company sites the sample was reduced to 12, as it 
was found that two firms had never attempted to elevate design’s role beyond a purely 
functional one (e.g., in both cases the design function had never been properly resourced).  
Multiple sources of evidence – in-depth interviews and documentation – were 
collected. This was to add breadth and depth to data collection and to contribute to the 
validity of the research (Eisenhardt, 1989). A total of 53 interviews were undertaken, lasting 
60 minutes on average and involving key actors working at different hierarchical levels and 
in various functional areas. In all companies we interviewed at least three individuals. In all 
cases one was the lead designer1, whereas the others were relevant personnel, as indicated by 
the lead designer2, typically operating at director level in marketing and product 
development. When design was mainly undertaken in collaboration with design agencies, at 
least one external designer was also interviewed. Such diversity of respondents was necessary 
                                                        
1 The only exception was company G where the lead designer was our initial contact, but eventually declined to 
be interviewed because of company changes happening during the period of data collection. The brand director, 
who had worked extensively with the design director, replaced him as our main informant and contact point.  
2 In some companies the lead designer had the title of Chief Design Officer, and sat at Board level; in others it 
was the Head of Design; and in some SMEs it simply had the title of ‘designer’. 
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as interviewees might lack required knowledge to answer all questions, and diverse 
viewpoints could be expressed (Voss, Tsikriktsis and Frohlich, 2002).  
Interviews consisted of three main parts. They started with grand tour questions, 
allowing interviewees to answer freely, with specific follow-up probes to explore the 
organizational context and new product and service development processes. In the second 
part of the interviews, respondents were asked about past and current investments in design, 
and reasons for such investments. Subsequent questions centered on the roles of design; for 
example, informants were asked whether and how design was acquiring a more or less 
legitimated position in the organization, and what the barriers were to its adoption and use. 
Further questions examined the dynamics, changes and adjustments, which had occurred over 
time, delving into events, activities and behaviors that accompanied such changes. Finally, 
questions were posed on specific projects, querying the dynamics of their progression. 
Respondents were asked to identify at least two projects – one successful, and one less 
successful (success was identified by the respondents, usually in terms of either 
innovativeness or business performance). For each project, the researchers investigated 
reasons for success or failure; changes and differences over time; the roles design had played; 
the main enablers and barriers to shifts in roles; and main outcomes.  
Data were collected over a nine-month period. All interviews were recorded and 
professionally transcribed. The first author and a trained assistant were involved in the 
collection and initial analysis of data. The first two authors then further interpreted the data, 
offering new insights. For validation, draft reports were sent to the case companies, and two 
presentations were delivered at events where research participants and colleagues had been 
invited (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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Characterization of design’s roles within the case sample 
An important feature of the case sample is the denotation of the role of design within each 
organization. Although this was primarily unraveled during data collection and analysis, it is 
reported here to provide a complete picture of the case organizations and their use and 
positioning of design. Table 1 reports details about the selected companies3, the interviewees, 
and the main role design played. Design roles were derived according to three main criteria: 
(1) the nature of design activities, which was identified by investigating the tasks designers 
generally undertook (Perks, Cooper and Jones, 2005); (2) the scope of design’s influence in 
decision-making processes in the firm; and (3) level of design’s impact, which was derived 
by asking interviewees about the development of specific products or services. Sometimes 
categorization was not clear-cut, as some firms appeared to be in a transitional stage, moving 
from one role to another.  
 From this analysis the case studies were categorized into, or in transition towards, 
three main roles: design as service, design as strategy, and design as dominant perspective. 
These are illustrated in Table 2 and explained below. 
 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 
Initial interviews confirmed that in all selected organizations the CEO or senior management 
team had invested in establishing a design function and attempted to utilize design 
strategically. However, in three cases design was still utilized mainly as a “service”. For 
example, at Company A, the design director recalled: “the biggest alliance, when I was hired, 
was the CEO himself. He was believing in the power of design and he was supporting me, he 
was putting me on a pedestal in the organization.” However, five years after appointing a 
                                                        
3 For confidentiality reasons, company names have been anonymized. 
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design director and transferring powers from other business units to a newly constituted 
design function, design was still “seen somewhat as a service function supporting the overall 
marketing effort” (marketing director). A global design manager confirmed: “[here] design 
becomes a service, because that’s what we are. In many projects, we are a service industry. 
… I think we’re missing opportunities. We’re missing breakthrough.” 
 In cases where design is used as a service, its influence is tightly defined and bounded 
to cost control, strengthening existing brands and enhancing product recognition. The 
organization does not trust design’s capacity to extend its role, such as proposing something 
new to the market. Its main activity therefore is to respond to specific briefs and information 
developed in other departments, with low involvement in cross-functional work. In this role, 
designers are also heavily reliant on customer feedback generated by other departments. 
Some of them expressed dissatisfaction and frustration with this situation: “you’re not 
recognized, you’re not appreciated as a … valuable function. People still see you as … a 
‘design waitress’. I tell you what I want and you need to organize it for me” (design director, 
Company A).  
 In several of the other sampled companies, design is elevated, or in the process of 
being elevated, to a strategic level. Here design informs strategic product decision-making, 
such as product branding, positioning, and creation of new markets. Its impact is perceived as 
organization-wide and as a critical way to attract customers and achieve competitive 
advantage. At Company G, for example, design emerged as the primary means of creating a 
new and uncontested market space, particularly significant as the company operates in a 
relatively saturated market: “we identified a white space opportunity. … We used design ... 
as a major factor for that product to make sure it was basically creating a segment” (director 
of business transformation, Company G).  
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 In the third role, dominant perspective, design leads not just in product or service 
development, but in everything the organization does. For example, at Company L, a large 
airline, design was regarded as the main way of operating: “What you are embedding is the 
important bit. Are you embedding design and the design team? Or are you embedding a point 
of view?” (head of design, Company L). Such a stance means that the organization does not 
consider design as a discrete unit; instead, it is part of the mindset of the organization: “the 
[internal] design team is really just a problem solving function, a creative problem solving 
function, expert in human behavior, so: how we see ourselves and understand the things that 
make people tick” (head of design, Company L). Fundamentally, what distinguishes this 
approach from the previous two is that design’s influence and impact permeate the 
organization. 
 
Data analysis 
Data analysis was conducted in four main steps, following the process proposed by Gioia, 
Corley and Hamilton (2012) (see also Pratt, Rockmann, and Kaufmann, 2006). The initial, 
first-order analysis – similar to Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) notion of open coding – led to the 
identification of many codes, which were labeled using respondent-centric terms. Second-
order categories were then obtained through axial coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). This 
helped reduce the initial codes to a smaller number, and researcher-centric concepts, either 
drawn from the literature or emerging from the data, were utilized. In the third step, the 
aggregate theoretical dimensions were identified. These categories (e.g., top management 
support, leading role of the design director) were defined in order to explain practices 
affecting the design elevation journey (Gioia et al., 2012). The authors iteratively re-
elaborated and refined them to ensure that their understandings were sufficiently aligned 
(Voss et al., 2002). For example, some interviewees referred to the importance of educating 
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non-designers to make them aware of what design can help achieve: “over time what we've 
done is educate the business to say: design … stands the opportunity to make a strategic 
difference with a lot more than just the packaging” (global design director, Company D) (see 
also quotes from interviews conducted at Company C in both the text and Table 3). These 
passages were coded as ‘education over what design could do’. Subsequently, this was 
regarded as an instance of the wider category ‘clarity over design’s role’. Finally, this 
category and ‘lack of appreciation of design’ were brought together under the aggregate 
dimension of ‘generating awareness of design’s role and contribution.’ 
 Finally, adopting a dynamic perspective, the findings were mapped against the 
elevation routes undertaken and main patterns were identified along these journeys. Figure 1 
shows the first-order codes, second-order categories, and aggregate theoretical dimensions. 
Table 3 presents representative evidence in relation to the main categories identified. 
 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 3 about here 
 
Findings 
The findings consist of two sections. In the first one, practices that underpin the elevation of 
design are presented and discussed. In doing so, each practice is first described and then 
tensions that arise in relation to such practices are unraveled in detail, as we show how each 
practice has the potential not only to facilitate but also to inhibit the elevation of design. 
Specifically, we demonstrate how the identified practices influence the elevation journey 
with reference to cross-case patterns (see Table 4) and how some firms were able to manage 
and reconcile the identified tensions (Table 5). Importantly, although all companies had 
intended to introduce and elevate design to a strategic role, outcomes varied. In some cases, 
despite senior management’s attempts, its role remained confined to a mainly operational 
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role. Other cases, where tensions were reconciled, demonstrated progression in making 
design more relevant to the point sometimes of becoming the dominant perspective across the 
organization. The second part of the findings frames the elevation of design as the acquisition 
of different forms of legitimacy, and shows how some case companies were able to attain not 
only pragmatic, but also moral and cognitive legitimacy. 
 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
 
Practices underpinning the elevation of design and related tensions 
Six major practices emerged as critical in influencing the elevation of design’s status in the 
firm: top management support, leadership of the design function, generation of awareness of 
design’s role and contribution, inter-functional coordination, evaluation of design, and 
formalization of product and service development processes. The findings suggest such 
practices appear to be relevant both in sectors where design is expected to play a major role 
and in sectors where it is not, and in both manufacturing and service-based organizations. 
Except for the importance of the CEO and the presence of less formalized processes in 
SMEs, no other major differences were found in relation to company size.  
Although some of these practices have been previously reported as influencing the 
elevation of a function, our study identifies novel ones and develops new insight by digging 
deeper into each practice. In so doing we unravel inherent tensions by showing how the way 
the same practice is implemented can act as either an enabler or a barrier in elevating 
design’s status (see Tables 4 and 5). Specifically, in those firms where design was regarded 
as a service, the manner in which such practices were implemented frequently had adverse 
effects on the elevation of design’s status. For example, in Company B the CEO’s support 
mainly translated into excessive involvement in design-related matters, thus leaving little 
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room for design to acquire greater autonomy and relevance, or for the lead designer to engage 
in strategic conversations. Also, insufficient awareness of design beyond mere aesthetics (see 
Table 3) was generated inside the company and this limited its role. In organizations where 
design was transitioning from service to strategic level, many of the identified practices were 
starting to be implemented in such a way as to play a positive role, but some practices were 
still having an adverse effect. For example, in telecommunication Company E, top 
management support was present and considerable changes had been made to the service 
development process, but clear design leadership had not been established. 
In companies where design was used either strategically or as a dominant perspective, 
companies were able to manage the identified tensions and the six practices helped elevate or 
sustain design’s status. At Company G, for instance, design had progressively acquired 
strategic relevance thanks to the influential work of the lead designer (recently appointed to 
the board) in clarifying and emphasizing design’s role, and to structural changes that had 
made design a more integral part of the NPD process. At Company J, where design had been 
considered the dominant perspective for decades, there was constant positive support from 
senior management; awareness of design’s role was kept high across functions; the NPD 
process was sufficiently structured, but not to the point of constraining creativity; and design 
was evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively at the end of projects. In the next section 
we examine each practice, identify the nature and sources of tensions, and then examine ways 
in which such tensions were overcome. 
 
Top management support 
Top management support was present in all organizations in the sample. The majority of 
cases appear to demonstrate that support from top management and, particularly in SMEs, 
from the CEO is necessary to embed design at a strategic level. At financial services firm C, 
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the head of design stated: “[the chief design officer] personally has a strong relationship with 
our CEO. ... That’s been incredibly helpful to the whole team ... [The CEO] gets it. He 
understands the value of customer experience starting with the customer and good design.” 
At Company H, a medium-sized enterprise, strategic design was only possible thanks to the 
Chairman’s belief in design as a means to create and sustain the business in the long-term 
(Table 3).  
 However, this study finds that having a direct link with the CEO or the Board is not 
always positive. Indeed, issues were clearly recognizable in situations where increased top 
management support ended up weakening design’s influence and impact. For example, 
several respondents cited examples of the company CEO or Board interfering and hanging 
onto an existing, unsuccessful service or product, and determining its design. At Company B, 
the commercial director discussed details of an unprofitable product, to which the Board felt 
so attached that they had become involved in its actual design, leaving designers with no 
freedom to act: “the internal designers have reworked it probably eight or nine times, and [the 
CEO and customers have] always came back with: “no, we don’t want to change it.” … So 
we have tried redesigning it lots of times and none of them have come to fruition, so it’s a 
complete waste of time.” In other cases, top management support translated into the fairly 
abrupt, top-down decision of creating a centralized design function, which resulted in other 
departments eventually developing a negative perception of design that then impeded its 
acceptance and integration. For example, at Company A, the CEO and CMO somewhat 
imposed the introduction of the design unit, and designers soon began to feel “resentment 
within the organization”, as identified in Table 3.  
 Several case organizations appeared capable of resolving the tension between initial 
endorsement, but lack of sustained support, and excessive involvement in two main ways. 
First, the CEO or members of the senior management team had an in-depth understanding 
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and a positive view of design. For example, at Company C the shift to a strategic use 
appeared to be greatly influenced by the CEO’s previous successful experiences with design. 
At Company K, the elevation of design to dominant perspective in the organization was 
driven by the CEO’s background in product design: “being the CEO with design training, it’s 
all about problem solving and looking at things differently. Why do we do things that way? Is 
there a better way of doing it? So, that thinking has been applied across the business rather 
than just in the product” (CEO and founder, Company K).  
 Second, sufficient autonomy for the design function coupled with a direct link with 
the top management team was identified as crucial. For example, the head of design at 
Company L stated: “you can be the best designer in the world and have great ideas, but 
unless you have directness and linkage and a common point of view, you often fail”. At 
Company I, the CEO clearly attributed importance to design: “for us I would say that design 
is everything, because without it we have no business.” However, as a designer stated: “here 
there’s a lot more freedom than where I used to work, because you’d have the owner of the 
company looking over your shoulder, seeing what you were doing, kind of thing, whereas 
here it’s not like that.” 
 
Leadership of the design function 
In several cases, the decision to invest in design was followed by appointing a director of the 
design function. However, how this role was carried out emerged as critical. In some 
companies leadership of the design function was perceived as weak and fragmented. For 
example, Company E appointed a head of design, but the design team remained dispersed: 
“[Here designers] do work together but not all in one team … Really we should all be sitting 
together [and] having a central design director. I don’t know exactly how high [in the 
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organization], but particularly high, who champions and has enough influencing power to 
drive an organization more powerfully towards design” (head of design, Company E). 
Conversely, in some companies design directors adopted an overly centralized and 
controlling approach, which resulted in them focusing principally on operational issues, thus 
failing to support the elevation of design. At Company A, for example, “I have to say quite a 
bit of [the design director]’s time has been diverted into systems and processes and budgets 
and policeman and all that kind of stuff” (marketing director).  
 A distinctive characteristic of organizations utilizing design more strategically was 
their capacity to reconcile the tension between fragmented and centralized approaches to the 
leadership of the design function. This was achieved by having design directors who 
concentrated their efforts in promoting design inside the company. For example, the global 
design director at Company D argued, “if we only talk to people on the financial level, then 
we’re completely missing the boat. Of course we have to talk the language of business, and 
finance, and return on investment ... but it is also our job as leaders of design within 
organizations to help people understand the thinking behind it”. At Company G, the design 
director’s capacity to engage with strategic matters such as long-term planning and product 
positioning was valued by colleagues and this led to his appointment to the board: 
“previously in our business we had the design director working for the engineering director. 
We deliberately don’t have that. The design director is at the same level as the engineering 
director, and I think that is hugely important, because that helps to demonstrate the 
importance we associate with design” (brand director).  
  
Generation of awareness of design’s role and contribution 
The practice of raising awareness in the organization about what design could do was 
apparent across the sampled organizations. However, findings show that insufficient 
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awareness can act as a formidable barrier to design’s elevation. On the one hand, some 
interviewees complained about lack of appreciation within the organization, as design was 
still regarded by many as a mere means to “make things look good” (see Table 3). Also, as 
the group design director of Company C stated: “things go wrong [when] you have designers 
and design working with people who are not design literate, who are uncomfortable with the 
design process”. On the other hand, problems emerge when the benefits of design are 
overemphasized, whereby there is an overemphasis on design myths and promises of 
unattainable outcomes. This can create unrealistic expectations, for example in relation to 
brand repositioning (see Table 3), and actually impede design’s elevation. Too high 
expectations can also inhibit the development and integration of common goals between 
professional groups, which are necessary for design to fulfill a more strategic role. For 
example, when reflecting on the interface between marketing and design, the design director 
at Company A stated: “I always call [marketers] unconsciously incompetent [as] they think 
that the physical world is something like an advertising storyboard and you can change it 
every other hour.” 
 This tension between low and unrealistic expectations was mainly resolved by 
purposefully exposing non-designers to design processes and practices. For example, at 
Company F the CEO recalled the importance of a design program run by an external agency 
to “create knowledge and awareness of design and what it could do.” Similarly, financial 
services Company C had started an education program in various business units: “If you look 
at the [name of unit], they just have no orientation around design at all. So, I spent last week 
in New York City … and they are extremely finance driven. … However, with education at 
the most senior levels here ... plus the success of [recently launched product], they all now 
are getting on board” (head of design). Where design had already been elevated to a strategic 
role and where it was the dominant perspective, respondents emphasized that design was 
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widely understood in the organization and that it had become “a fundamental part of our 
DNA. There is a real strong recognition that innovation and design is what makes our brand 
strong” (director of brand and customer experience, Company L). Here all interviewees were 
taking for granted that design was playing a unique and critical role. 
 
Inter-functional coordination 
The coordination of functions emerged as a dominant practice underpinning the elevation of 
design. At various case companies, examples emerged of conflict among functions in the 
initial phases of product or service development, which led to inadequately developed and 
disagreed briefs, and, eventually, to failure: “when the design team and the brand team aren’t 
in full agreement with what the brief is, that’s when it doesn’t work … it goes into a … bit of 
a car crash” (external designer, Company D).  
 As part of their efforts to elevate design, several firms were trying to reduce “silo 
mentality” by “bringing the organization together – business, technology, control functions – 
all together, centered and anchored on the customer or the client through human-centered 
design” (group design director, Company C). However, excessive inter-functional 
coordination can entail involving too many parties and going through unnecessary iterations. 
This proved ineffective, especially when coupled with unclear decision-making processes, 
and led to ‘design by committee’ (see also Table 3): “the project took a very long time, and it 
went through multiple iterations of everyone having their say, everyone wanting to see 
different versions. So the design agency went through something like 26 stages … too many 
iterations that led to sort of dilution” (global design director, Company D).  
 Reconciliation of the two extremes was achieved by creating cross-functional teams at 
the beginning of projects and “healthy tensions” among functional groups in the product or 
service development process: “we do have to have difficult conversations, but that, kind of, 
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increased tension in the process is really fascinating creatively because it makes you think 
harder” (design manager, Company D). At automotive company G, the sales and operations 
director talked about a “healthy debate ... between manufacturing, engineering and design, in 
terms of the purest what we want, to what feasibly can we deliver in a volume way, in a 
quality way, in a cost effective way.” To do so, different agendas and plans were developed 
coherently from the beginning. For example: “I’ve been in this position three years ago, and I 
made up my mind very early on that it was really important that my role and [the chief 
designer’s] role were very, very close and I think the design agenda and the brand agenda are 
the same agenda. And historically that hasn’t been the case, you know, they’ve been miles 
apart” (brand director, Company G).  
 
Evaluation of design 
The cases exhibit great diversity in the ways organizations evaluate design’s contribution to 
innovation and business performance. As expected, the sampled SMEs tended to rely more 
on informal evaluation rather than on performance targets and indicators. In the larger firms 
practices varied.  
  Nonetheless, a tension emerged between lack of evaluation of design’s impact on one 
hand, and excessive emphasis on measurement on the other. Indeed, some interviewees 
lamented their incapacity to quantify design’s contribution and impact to organizational 
success, as indicated by the head of design at Company E (see Table 3). However, 
dysfunctional consequences also arose when organizations attempted to accurately and 
precisely quantify the effects of design, both during development phases and after launch: 
“we will, you know, over time decompose [the project] with econometric modeling and 
understanding the true impact”, exclaimed the marketing director of Company A. Talking 
about the initial stages in NPD, a design manager at the same company added: “you write a 
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concept board, that's the first step in the innovation which has a product idea on it, a price on 
it, and short description. Then you can test this is an online environment … and it is 
measured against a database … It may tell you that you're in a plus 25% top box, so you 
know that, okay, that's something I can move forward with. … So my incentive is on two 
times 25 million [net revenue], two ideas that are 25 million or higher, which is huge. … 
Nobody, and even less so in this day and age, is rewarded for taking risks. You’re rewarded 
for success. You are probably fired for failures, but that breeds a certain culture”. A paradox 
therefore emerges: the greater the requirement for design to prove its contribution through 
detailed analysis early on, the more conservative the design approach taken. As further quotes 
in Table 3 exemplify, constantly monitoring and challenging design to provide evidence may 
reflect a lack of trust in the organization and eventually make design’s impact negligible.  
  Organizations where design’s status was higher were capable of managing the tension 
between lack of measurement and excessive emphasis on it by conducting evaluations at the 
end of projects, often through the use of non-financial measures such as customer satisfaction 
and time to market, or performance proxies, such as design and innovation awards (see 
quotes in Table 3). In other cases, relatively simple measures of success were introduced. For 
example, the Director of HR and external affairs at Company L explained that, when 
assessing newly designed services, “we do look at our employees’ engagement and we look 
at our customer satisfaction – I think those are the two things that will tell you whether you’re 
getting it right”. Furthermore, in organizations where design was utilized as dominant 
perspective, financial targets were only considered at later stages in the NPD process: 
“Initially, [sales targets] are not even considered at all. I think the initial discussion is: what 
ideas are there? It doesn’t matter whether they’re good or bad. … A lot of things, like profit 
margins [are] not really necessarily considered initially because you’re just trying to get a 
load of ideas together. That will come later on when you start whittling the ideas down to 
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fewer and fewer” (head of design, Company K). 
 
Formalization of product and service development processes  
In most of the cases, changes to processes and routines were needed to increase design’s 
scope and impact. When this did not happen, design struggled to play a strategic role. For 
example, at Company C, a financial services firm which had recently set up a design unit, the 
digital director lamented that sometimes “the business rather engaged through known 
processes” and did not involve the designers. The design director reiterated this point by 
complaining that in the firm “there’s no real, well executed and documented design process 
yet. We’re definitely focused on that and understand the need for it, we don’t have it today.” 
Indeed, firms using design more strategically appeared to benefit from formalized processes 
where design was an integral component. For instance, Company G had recently established 
a new NPD process where design was given more prominence. This was regarded as an 
important contributor to one of the firm’s major successes: “I think the process that we’ve 
created … is producing winners. And the process itself, I wouldn’t say it guarantees, but they 
will always be very good designs” (director of business transformation).  
 However, a tension emerged in the case sample between insufficient and excessive 
formalization. In some instances, over-formalization led to rigid processes and suboptimal 
results. This is exemplified in situations where too many stakeholders were involved, 
resulting in ‘design by committee’ (see Table 3). In other cases, the lack of a sufficiently 
codified process, because of either overconfidence or the belief that process could hinder 
creativity, led to project failure. For example, the CEO of Company F explained a poor new 
product introduction as the result of a weakly structured process: “we probably missed some 
key stages of design development … we probably didn’t give enough consideration to the 
strategic considerations of how … we might compete … what difference did we bring?” 
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Weak structuring of process was also evident in cases where users were not involved, and 
this was often attributed to overconfidence: “what went wrong was: in that design and 
innovation process, for a very innovative product we weren’t testing it and embedding it and 
listening to the users of that product enough. … It’s an example where we’ve almost tried to 
over-innovate without taking our consumers along that journey with us” (finance director, 
Company I). Similar complaints were made in relation to poorly developed briefs: “Not 
putting enough time into the brief … tends to create lots of re-works in the project. … You 
end up with a weak design that is not going to change anything” (marketing director, 
Company A). 
 Striking the right balance between flexibility and formalization is not simple; 
however, some organizations succeeded in introducing clear processes that were not overly 
rigid, especially in the more exploratory phases. At company E, the introduction of a 
structured, but sufficiently flexible process enabled the organization to have a “very clear 
customer focus” (see Table 3). At furniture Company J: “there is an extensive vetting process 
that we go through before a design firm is granted a project to work with us” (director of 
insight). However, its development process is rather exploratory and open-ended: “Find a few 
really good designers … then trust them … We kind of go: ‘Well, here’s a problem to solve. 
Send it out to the designers and see what they bring back’” (director of finance, Company J). 
At Company J, the open-endedness of the process and the trust placed in external designers 
was clearly reflected in designers’ freedom to challenge briefs.  
 
Elevation of design as seeking and acquiring legitimacy 
After examining the six practices and related tensions, we further analyzed the data 
considering the elevation of design’s status from an organizational legitimacy perspective. In 
doing so, we show how three types of legitimacy - pragmatic, moral, and cognitive 
 29 
(Suchman, 1995) – were acquired across the cases and highlight differences according to how 
the practices were deployed (Table 6). 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Pragmatic legitimacy 
In this study, pragmatic legitimacy was often expressed in terms of “making the business 
case” for design and proving its effectiveness. Attempts to acquire pragmatic legitimacy were 
most evident in companies attempting to elevate design from service to a strategic level. At 
Company C, the head of design asserted: “once we prove ourselves with multiple product 
launches, get great customer feedback, make lots of revenue off of those ... and the design 
around it becomes something that people talk about, then all of a sudden, the message is a 
hell of a lot easier to sell throughout the group.” Other interviewees stressed the importance 
of demonstrating design’s value to internal stakeholders as early as possible through 
commercial successes and of sustaining it over time: “Our board of directors on an annual 
basis reviews our design output. [The design director] creates a very large space … where he 
sets up an extraordinary showcase of the work that’s been done in the previous 12 months. 
And everyone in the company files through that space, but particularly, you know, it is the 
real focus and attention of our board of directors” (innovation director, Company D). 
Conversely, the global design director at Company A, discussing the difficulty of elevating 
design’s status within the firm, reflected: “when I started in this position I maybe made the 
mistake, I don’t know, to not lead by example. So, take five projects, do them very well, hope 
that they will be successful in the market and then the success will lead other people into 
following that process of creation. … I did not decide to go that way. … And now we often, 
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and it’s almost funny, yes, we think we can do design in six weeks’ time because nobody 
understands what design is and what it’s about and what the final deliverable will be.” 
  
Moral legitimacy 
While pragmatic legitimacy was recognized as necessary, various interviewees working at 
firms where design was in the process of or already being utilized strategically argued for 
design’s role as morally legitimate, intended as “design is the right thing to do.” For instance, 
the design director at Company D stated: “the funding of design is based on the belief that 
we’ll make a difference. So the data that makes a difference, but [it is] the belief that it makes 
a difference, backed up by data, and the importance that people place on doing it.” Such 
“belief” derived not only from continued evidence of success, but also from the wider 
appreciation of designers’ ways of working, and their alternative perspective on business 
challenges. At automotive Company G, the global brand director exemplified: “We’re going 
through a pitch process for our motor shows … we spend literally tens of millions of pounds, 
and the design of the motor show stand is really important. And I could quite legitimately not 
involve [the design director] in any of that, but I actually very, very deliberately do involve 
him in that process because he has a designer’s eye. … He’s the most creative person we’ve 
got … and he has a point of view on how we should present our cars and he’s probably much 
better able than I am to judge a stand design and whether that would be a good environment 
in which to present our cars. So I kind of work very, very hard to involve him in more than 
being just a car designer.” 
 
Cognitive legitimacy 
When design was being elevated to or already being used as the dominant perspective, it was 
perceived as cognitively legitimate, as its importance was not questioned and value creation 
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was taken for granted; for example: “as far as I’m concerned, everybody [in the company] is 
responsible for design in some shape or form” (project manager, Company H). Discussing 
how cognitive legitimacy was being attained at Company H, a design engineer emphasized 
the formalization and, at the same time, flexibility of their NPD process: “it can be anything 
from a very very well put together brief which will identify what the problem is, what the 
potential customers are, it will identify the volumes that we might be looking to sell, the 
market price, the competitors. [But,] you know, we are fairly flexible. Sometimes we have 
done a project and it is only at the end of the project that we have actually had the design 
brief.” In other companies where design was utilized as dominant perspective, several 
respondents spoke of the founders’ approach to design and of the need to keep this relevant in 
the firm: “the founders are present in the culture, and that story is told over and over and 
over.... and embedded, you know” (director of finance, Company J). Another major 
explanation of how cognitive legitimacy was attained and sustained relates to the deeper 
understanding of design’s nature and benefits acquired over time; as an external designer 
working for Company J stated: “it’s because [employees] have experienced it and 
experienced it positively over time, so much so that they’ve come to understand [design] as a 
positive practice.”  
 
Discussion  
This study explores the elevation of design within the firm and identifies six practices that 
underpin the enhancement of design’s status (research question 1). Importantly, this research 
shows that there are fundamental tensions, which should be identified and addressed if design 
is to be elevated to a strategic level, since the same practice can play both positive and 
negative roles (research question 2). The results are consistent across sectors and in both 
manufacturing and service-based organizations. However, a salient contingency is that some 
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tensions emerge more prominently in those organizations that have recently started to invest 
in design. For example, companies C, D and E clearly experienced tensions in relation to 
formalization of processes and evaluation of design (see Table 4).  
 The investigation of six major practices unravels tensions that need to be managed if 
design’s status is to be elevated. Hence, this study shows that support from top management 
is required to trigger investment in design (Homburg et al., 2015). However, it may also 
hamper the work of designers, because of either lack of sustained backing over time or 
excessive involvement in design activities. Therefore, a direct and continued connection with 
the design function appears essential, but sufficient autonomy should also be granted. 
Similarly, the appointment of a design director can act as a catalyst in the design elevation 
process, but only if the design director is able to play a leading role, lobbying and effectively 
communicating design’s value. Generating design awareness emerges as another key enabler, 
but only as long as expectations over design’s contribution do not become unrealistic. The 
promotion of inter-functional coordination also helps elevate design to a strategic level, as it 
can promote collaboration and mutual appreciation of different functions’ processes and 
mindsets (Beverland et al., 2016). However, balance needs to be stuck between too loose 
connections among functions and consensus-based decision-making among many 
stakeholders, as both can act as barriers and lead to suboptimal results. Evaluation of design 
effectiveness emerges as another important practice, but it appears to play a positive role only 
when measurement is used either retrospectively or mainly in the latter stages of the product 
or service development process. Finally, the formalization of the development process 
supports the elevation of design when design is an integral component and when the process 
is clearly structured, but kept sufficiently flexible, especially in the initial phases.  
 This research also shows that the six practices should not be considered in isolation, 
as they contribute in combination – rather than individually – to either enabling or inhibiting 
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the strategic use of design. For example, although top management support aids design’s 
elevation, the concurrent reconfiguration of processes is also required. Furthermore, the 
progressive introduction of a clear process and the constitution of cross-functional teams at 
the beginning of projects can offset initial lack of organizational awareness of design. 
Similarly, newly appointed design directors may be capable of playing an influencing role in 
organizations if top management supports them without either excessive interference or 
constant monitoring. Moreover, by unraveling the dynamics of the cases, this study shows 
how time is an important dimension in relation to the elevation of a function’s status. It is the 
interplay of several practices, over time, which can increase a function’s relevance and 
effectiveness, making the transition from strategic to dominant perspective possible. Indeed, 
sufficient time is required to modify or introduce new processes, create awareness of what a 
function can do, and, ultimately, foster a culture where a function is embedded. Therefore, 
this research warns against potential oversimplification and static consideration of facilitating 
practices and related tensions. 
 Findings show how the elevation of design’s status relates to seeking and acquiring 
legitimacy (research question 3). In particular, pragmatic legitimacy appears to be a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for status elevation. Indeed, calculative, rational 
appeals and a constant focus on demonstrating design’s effectiveness may eventually act as 
barriers to elevating design. The acquisition of moral legitimacy appears to be a discriminant 
factor between organizations where design was regarded as a service and those that were 
utilizing design strategically. Design as dominant perspective corresponds to a high level of 
cognitive legitimacy, whereby design is widely utilized as the main explanation for the 
organization’s success.  
 
Theoretical contributions 
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This study makes four main theoretical contributions. First, it extends the body of literature 
intent on identifying the practices that explain a function’s enhancement of status. Broader 
debates on the importance of elevating particular functions to a more strategic level – in areas 
such as marketing (Feng et al., 2015; Homburg et al. 2015) and HR (Jackson et al., 2014; 
Ulrich et al., 2008) – are relatively few and largely silent about how this is done. This 
research provides richer insight to extant preliminary findings drawn in relation to other 
functional disciplines and proposes further practices. Marketing and HR management 
scholars have identified alignment with organizational goals and internal image as two 
critical issues (Homburg et al., 2015; Ulrich et al., 2008). This study supports this finding by 
highlighting the fundamental role of generating design awareness across the organization and 
support by top management in raising and sustaining design’s status. However, it also shows 
the importance of appointing a design director who plays a leading role, promoting inter-
functional coordination, evaluating and communicating design’s contribution, and embedding 
design in structured business processes.  
 Secondly, the examination of the last two practices in particular provides an 
empirically based perspective on two enduring debates in the innovation management 
literature, between formalization and creativity (Gilson et al., 2005; Leenders, van Engelen 
and Kratzer, 2007), and between control and adaptability (Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011). 
The first conflict emerges between the requirement to ensure clarity and accountability, often 
through the use of measurement systems, and the importance of delegation and trust. Here, 
the findings show that positive results can be attained by communicating clear direction at the 
beginning and evaluating performance at the end, while leaving sufficient discretion to the 
design function (or to external design agencies) during the development process. By delaying 
questions about design’s potential contribution in the NPD process, its influence and impact 
can be enhanced. Conversely, requesting detailed information in the early stages of NPD 
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followed by constant monitoring proves particularly dysfunctional. 
The second conflict relates to the seemingly incompatible need for systems and 
processes to guide design tasks and innovation more broadly, but also to the autonomy and 
slack necessary for ‘designerly ways of working’4. The findings suggest that organizations 
may be able to address this conflict, at least in part, by creating clear processes that ensure the 
alignment and coordination among functions necessary for NPD success, but also 
accommodate design practices (Beverland et al., 2015). Instead, when processes become 
overly structured and rigid, or excessively loose and chaotic, companies are likely to 
experience failure, because of either insufficient innovativeness or disregard of fundamental 
elements (e.g., lack of customer focus).  
Thirdly, considering the elevation of design from a legitimacy point of view, higher 
status can be seen as deriving from greater legitimacy, as a function is increasingly perceived 
“not only as more worthy, but also as more meaningful, more predictable, and more 
trustworthy” (Suchman, 1995; p. 575). In marketing and HR management studies, arguments 
for elevating a function to a strategic level mainly focus on demonstrating its importance to 
performance outcomes, namely to acquire pragmatic legitimacy. Similarly, design scholars 
have often framed their arguments in pragmatic terms and considered the link between design 
and organizational performance (see, e.g., Lockwood, 2007; 2012). While these are 
necessary, they are insufficient to achieve long-term legitimacy. This study shows that when 
design is proposed - and eventually understood by non-designers - as a relevant, but 
alternative way of operating, it can lead to the acquisition of moral legitimacy, i.e., 
“judgments about whether the activity is the ‘right thing to do’” (Suchman, 1995; p. 579), 
rather than decisions made purely on the basis of calculated returns. The attainment of 
cognitive legitimacy - in this context, the elevation of design to dominant perspective within 
                                                        
4 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight. 
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the firm – is not only an outcome of moral legitimacy over time, but it can be facilitated by 
strategic approaches, whereby “managers must go beyond simply selecting among existing 
cultural beliefs; they must actively promulgate new explanations of social reality” (Suchman, 
1995; p. 591). This was apparent in cases where design was persistently communicated as the 
principal way of operating and regarded as the main success factor to the point of being 
perceived as indispensable (Tost, 2011). 
 Finally, given the interest in design-driven innovation and a strategic role for design, 
the contextual focus of this study makes a contribution to the field of NPD by moving beyond 
the recognition that design can play different roles in organizations (Perks et al., 2005) to 
understanding how to elevate design’s status in organizations (Beverland and Farrelly, 2007; 
Noble, 2011). Moreover, it relates to debates on design thinking and shows that, rather than 
relying on simplistic messages (e.g., “we all need to think like designers” (Brown and Katz, 
2011, p. 382)), for design to become the dominant perspective, pragmatic and moral 
arguments should be put forward consistently and over time, so that design becomes integral 
part of what an organization does and its contribution to value creation is taken for granted. 
 
Managerial implications 
In contrast to existing design research, which tends to be framework-driven (Best et al., 2010; 
Danish Design Centre, 2003), this study derives its findings from deep insight into 
managerial decision-making and practices, which suggest specific pathways for practitioners 
intent on raising design’s status. Undoubtedly, senior management support is necessary to 
facilitate and sustain the transition from design as service to a more strategic level. However, 
senior managers should develop clear signposts early on of how the organization is going to 
benefit from design and, progressively, grant autonomy to the design function. The 
appointment of a lead designer at senior level is crucial to manage expectations and influence 
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colleagues on the value and contribution of design. If successful, these influencing efforts 
could contribute to positioning design beyond operational and functional constraints.  
  Creating cross-functional teams could help design build internal alliances with other 
functions and ultimately lead to improved NPD outcomes. However, clarity over decision-
making powers should be ensured, and creative, healthy tensions between groups maintained. 
Therefore, terms such as ‘design thinking’ and ‘design-led’ should be downplayed, because 
they may suggest an attempt by designers to increase their power at the expense of other 
functions, or to introduce a single way of approaching product and service development. 
Moreover, modifications to existing organizational processes should be made to enhance 
design’s status; however, a careful balance should be struck between formalization and 
flexibility to ensure clarity and structure as well as empowerment and adaptability. 
Introducing clear objectives and milestones at the beginning of a project, and leaving 
sufficient discretion to designers and other NPD professionals during it could achieve this. 
 Elevating design’s status can be considered a positioning problem, which initially 
requires design’s capacity to articulate its unique contribution in terms of functional 
performance advantages, while also addressing points of parity (the organization’s strategic 
goals). Subsequently, greater emphasis should be given to the unique ways design operates. 
In this context, a key method of design thinking – framing – may play a critical part. 
Designers must frame their contributions carefully for different audiences and explain how 
design complements other functions’ value building activities and helps them achieve core 
goals, be they operational efficiency, customer engagement, sales, launch success, or higher 
margins. However, as this research shows, formal performance targets and indicators should 
be created to positively challenge employees rather than to monitor them, and evidence of 
good performance may be drawn from non-financial measures, proxies and awards, 
particularly at the end of projects. 
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 Finally, this research has implications for designers and design education. Designers 
often start their careers as technical specialists with functional expertise. However, for 
strategic design to work, they have to  be able to join cross-functional teams and act as 
influencers who champion design. They have to be capable of using and understanding 
different languages and perspectives and be fully aware of commercial considerations. 
Having gained a high level of trust and position, they can then play leading roles, and get 
increasingly involved in articulating strategies and future scenarios. 
 
Limitations and future research 
This study has several limitations, which provide potential avenues for future research. First 
of all, the chosen organizations are based in the United Kingdom, where the role of design is 
likely to be more strategic than in other countries, for example Asian ones. Future studies 
could consider different geographical contexts, as practices and tensions in elevating design 
may differ.  
 Although this research focused on generalizing to theory rather than to a statistical 
population, further studies are required to validate the findings with a larger sample. These 
could investigate the pervasiveness of the identified practices and related tensions, as well as 
the effectiveness of the strategies proposed in the managerial implications section. Also, 
qualitative and quantitative research could consider (a) where strategic design contributes, (b) 
how it adds value uniquely, and (c) under what competitive and industry conditions elevation 
becomes critical. Moreover, while in this study interviewees were asked to reflect on the 
elevation journey of design over time, longitudinal studies in which change is tracked over 
time could shed further light on how design’s status is elevated. 
 Future research could also examine the limitations of a strategic role for design5. 
                                                        
5 We are indebted to a reviewer for pointing this out. 
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Although not the focus of this study, some informants highlighted problems with ‘design 
over-confidence’, often expressed as the rushed introduction of a new product or service, the 
lack of customer orientation, or becoming enamored with a product design at the expense of 
market analysis. Although this paper is predicated on elevating design’s status, future 
research on the potential dangers of this elevation is necessary. 
Finally, this study suggests that different conceptualizations of design are intimately 
related to how individuals make sense of design. Past research has considered this issue, but 
only to a limited extent. Beverland and Farrelly (2007), for example, drew on widespread 
industry interest in becoming ‘design-led’ in their exploratory study, although they did not 
explain how this could be achieved. Similarly, in their extensive review on design 
management Ravasi and Stigliani (2012) called for research on ‘design-driven capabilities’. 
Building on recent work on resourceful sensemaking in new product development (Beverland 
et al., 2016), research could further explore the sense-making and sense-giving practices used 
by designers to enhance their internal status. For example, specific attributes of designers, 
such as problem-solving skills particularly in the context of “wicked” problems, could be 
considered as facilitators of the elevation of design’s status. 
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Table 1. Details of case organizations, interviewees, and roles of design 
Case Core Focus  Sector Employees Design 
role 
Interviewees 
A Product Consumer 
goods 
10,000-
50,000 
Service Design director 
(interviewed twice), two 
design managers, 
marketing director, SVP 
product category 
B Service  Logistics 250-500 Service Founder and chairman, 
two designers, 
commercial director, 
finance director  
C 
 
Service Financial 
services 
100,000-
150,000 
Service Chief design officer, 
digital director, group 
design director, head of 
design 
D 
 
Product Consumer 
goods 
10,000-
50,000 
From 
service to 
strategic 
Global design director, 
design manager, 
innovation director, 
external designer  
E 
 
Service Telecommunic
ations 
10,000-
50,000 
From 
service to 
strategic 
Head of design, 
consumer and marketing 
director, head of service 
management, senior 
design manager 
F 
 
Product Consumer 
goods 
50-100 Strategic CEO and founder, 
production and technical 
director, production 
manager, finance 
manager  
G 
 
Product Automotive 10,000-
50,000 
Strategic Brand director, sales 
operations director, 
director of business 
transformation 
H 
 
Product Manufacturing 250-500 From 
strategic to 
dominant 
perspective 
Senior project manager, 
design engineer, product 
manager 
I 
 
Product Apparel and 
fashion 
1,000-5,000 From 
strategic to 
dominant 
perspective 
CEO, senior designer, 
junior designer, 
marketing manager, 
finance director 
J 
 
Product Furniture 1,000-
10,000 
Dominant 
perspective 
VP product design, SVP 
marketing, director of 
insight, director of 
finance, team leader 
R&D, external designer 
K 
 
Product Luggage 
manufacturing 
50-100 Dominant 
perspective 
CEO, head of design, 
head of sales, marketing 
manager 
L 
 
Service Airline travel 1,000-
10,000 
Dominant 
perspective 
Head of design, director 
of sales and marketing, 
director of brand and 
customer experience, 
director of HR and 
external affairs 
 
  
 48 
Table 2. Main roles of design in sampled cases 
 
Role of design Main characteristics Illustrative quotes 
Design as service  Aesthetic orientation; 
design is mainly 
required to respond to 
external demands, 
often in the form of a 
narrowly defined brief. 
 
“I think there is still a fundamental misunderstanding 
of what design can offer and how it could be applied. 
And this is a cliché, but it’s amazing how many 
people you meet who still think design is about 
aesthetics” (group design director, Company C). 
“The word ‘design’ is a very hard word in this 
organization. … Many people still think that we are 
putting the lipstick on the pig” (design director, 
Company A).  
Design as 
strategy  
Design is involved in 
defining the company 
direction in 
collaboration with 
other functions. 
“We use very deliberately the word ‘design’, not 
‘styling’. This isn’t styling. This is design and it’s 
design integrity, and that combination of design 
integrity and modern world capability is a killer 
combination for this business” (brand director, 
Company G) 
“You follow a good process, you know, you work 
with the right designers, you do really good quality 
design, and it leads to business growth” (design 
manager, Company D). 
Design as 
dominant 
perspective 
Design is regarded as 
the primary means to 
set direction. 
“Design is not something that is done by this team of 
crazy kids on the third floor, but it’s part of 
everything, part of everybody’s world. And being 
responsible for innovation and creativity is a 
responsibility that everybody can have, or everybody 
should have.” (director of brand and customer 
experience, Company L) 
Design “is not just a shape or a form or a function, 
but it’s a new way of seeing things, it’s a new point 
of view, and the product itself is only one way of 
expressing that idea” (external designer, Company 
J). 
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Table 3. Analysis: second and first order coding of critical practices in elevating the role 
of design, with representative evidence 
Second-order 
codes 
First-order codes Representative evidence  
Sustained 
positive 
investment  
Top management 
investment in 
design  
“To succeed you have to have the senior management buy in, you 
have to have that agenda where they want to invest in [design]” 
(design manager, Company D). 
 Board / CEO’s 
belief in design 
“It runs through [the CEO’s] DNA, you can see it in him when you 
talk to him, that’s who he is. So he is very aware of the importance of 
good design” (finance director, Company F). 
 Direct connection 
with the CEO or 
Board 
“Five weeks ago, they announced [name] promotion to chief design 
officer. So, not only does [name] have a say in, you know, the 
executive leadership team … he has a dotted line into [CEO’s name]” 
(head of design, Company C). 
Destructive 
role of senior 
management 
Controlling top 
management team 
“We get a new design come in, we get different mock ups made, and 
then you end up with five middle aged men [i.e., the Board] deciding 
which one to go with; and I don’t think that’s a good profile at all” 
(finance director, Company B). 
“With the previous CEO [known for his controlling style], there’s no 
way I would have thought about working for [company C], I would 
have stayed happy at [competitor]” (digital director, Company C). 
 Poor management 
of power relations 
in the organization 
Designers felt “resentment within the organization particularly as 
budgets were taken from countries and given to [the design unit] … 
you can imagine that in the local organizations they didn’t like [the 
design team] to be around, because we were interfering in the 
empowerment that they had in order to create the design for the 
brands” (design director, Company A). 
Strategic role 
of design 
director 
Providing a design 
perspective on 
strategic questions 
Strategic decisions triggered by the design director “really did push 
people here, senior managers outside of their comfort zone, as well. 
Which is really good for the company, because that’s actually 
instilled a level of confidence in our approach moving forward” 
(sales operations director, Company G). 
 Influencing role 
within the 
organisation 
“We have got a big influencing job here to do, to find [our] sponsor, 
to persuade, to help people understand” (global design director, 
Company D). 
Poor influence 
of the design 
director 
Lack of a senior 
design lead  
“We’re hiring a new head of marketing and design soon. [The current 
one – a middle manager] is spread very thinly, and I don’t think she’s 
necessarily specialised in design” (finance director, Company B). 
 Focus on mainly 
operational matters 
“It's essential to influence [the board] on a strategic design thinking 
level … and I think that's where a lot of my peers fall down: they 
don’t do that” (global design director, Company D). 
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Table 3. Analysis: second and first order coding of critical practices in elevating the role 
of design, with representative evidence, continued 
Second-
order codes 
First-order codes Representative evidence 
Clarity over 
design’s role 
Education over 
what design could 
do 
“The only thing that stops [embedding design] is really the education, 
awareness and human capital” (chief design officer, Company C). 
On the need of educating colleagues: “I think for a lot of people … they 
see design a little bit as, you know, like a dress you put on.  They don't 
see the business value of design … They'll know it as making something 
look pretty. And I think it's that thinking in this specific organisation that 
we need to shift” (design manager 1, Company A). 
 Creating a design 
DNA 
“In the 1930s, when (Company J) was really making this ornate very 
heavy wood furniture, there was this one designer who came in and told 
[the company founder]: “what you’re doing is really wrong, people don’t 
live like this anymore. People need, you know, things that are simple and 
that are lighter that could go into smaller rooms”, and he defined what 
modern living is. [The founder] trusted that new vision and started 
working with him and said: “okay, well, so what should furniture be 
like?” And this was the beginning of much more Bauhaus-like style. I 
think that collaboration and the collaboration with [famous designers], 
you know… we are eating the fruits of this DNA in a way” (external 
designer, Company J). 
Lack of 
appreciation 
of design 
Reductive view of 
design 
“You can’t get precious about design [here]. We are trying to do the right 
thing for customers” (consumer and marketing director, Company E). 
“We spend a lot of money on making sure the working environment is as 
pleasant as possible… And that includes design - making sure it looks 
good” (finance director, Company B). 
 Unrealistic 
expectations 
“To genuinely be able to successfully revitalize this brand … you can’t 
just put a [new product design] on the shelf and expect this brand to be 
repositioned. It’s got to be, you know, from the core, from the heart, as 
well” (design manager 2, Company A). 
Positive 
relations 
among 
functional 
specialists 
Bringing people 
together from the 
start 
“The collaboration [between operations, design and marketing] was very 
strong from the outset. So I think that one of the key reasons for success 
was the strength of collaboration internally across, you know, multiple 
functional areas” (head of service management, Company E). 
“We have cross-functional teams on all the projects that we’re working 
on whether it’s a new product or whether it’s a new process. You know, 
there’ll be people involved from manufacturing, from marketing, from 
[the design unit], you know, right from the very beginning, really, I 
mean, as soon as we get concepts” (product manager, Company H).   
 Healthy tension 
between groups 
“Our decision-making is centred around sort of what we believe about 
design. It’s a healthy tension. I mean, there’s always tension with a new 
design and the more innovative, the greater the tension, obviously. But it 
is what we do.” So you would see tensions as a positive thing? “Yes. I 
mean, it’s a good, healthy tension” (SVP marketing, Company J). 
“I think sometimes those tensions [between functions] are fine. If you 
have no tension, there nobody's challenging each other. And so, you 
don't want an environment with absolutely no tension” (director of sales 
and marketing, Company L). 
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Poor 
interactions 
across 
functions 
Silo mentality “We are a pretty silo organization, and collaboration is still a bit of a 
difficult word in [the company], and if people collaborate it’s more out 
of, I would almost call it out of need and based on personal 
relationships” (design director, Company A). 
 Design by 
committee 
“The design process was too democratic and we had, you know, the 
Americans saying they wanted this [product] to look like this and be 
more sophisticated … and we had the Australians and the South Africans 
saying “no, we actually want [product name] to really go back to the 
basics.” And so the design brief wasn’t single-minded and the design, 
therefore, wasn’t single-minded and I think it suffered as a result of that” 
(brand director, Company G). 
“A camel is a horse designed by a committee, because a committee is 
actually the process itself working against the original concept, the idea” 
(head of service management, Company E). 
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Table 3. Analysis: second and first order coding of critical practices in elevating the role 
of design, with representative evidence, continued 
Second-order 
codes 
First-order 
codes 
Representative evidence  
Measurement 
as a means to 
understand 
performance  
Simple 
performance 
measures to 
positively 
challenge 
employees  
“25% of our products must be new products. … What makes (Company 
H) unique is the fact that we are measured on 25%. We are encouraged to 
be different. We are encouraged to fix problems. We are encouraged to 
move into markets that nobody else wants to go into” (design engineer, 
Company H). 
 Reliance on 
assessments 
and awards 
“We have an assessment, in terms of internal assessments around the 
attributes, but also externally, we get awards, effectively, design awards, 
which give us a clear view that we’re on the right track” (director of 
business transformation, Company G).   
Do you have specific measures of success? “No…because we believe in 
effective design, so there are now various competitions, [such as the] 
Design Effectiveness Awards. So, it’s something we track” (external 
designer, Company D). 
Measurement 
as a control 
mechanism  
Difficulty in 
proving 
design’s 
contribution 
“We are being asked by the company for evidence for how much money 
we saved doing things. It is a difficult question to answer because there are 
so many aspects that drive customer satisfaction that are beyond our 
control … And these kind of things to say, ok, we have now gone up by 
5% on measure x. It is very tough to measure that. I mean I have been 
wrestling with that ever since we started” (head of design, Company E). 
 Requiring 
evidence as 
sign of lack of 
trust 
“We’re a business that is very sceptical until there’s evidence. … We 
won’t be given more resource just because we feel this is a good idea” 
(marketing director, Company A). 
“The worst thing is when that trust disappears or is not there  and so you 
become constantly questioning the values, the expertise, the knowledge 
and the drivers of the other people, and that’s hell, you know” (external 
designer, Company J).  
Incorporating 
design in clear 
and structured 
processes 
Modifications 
to existing 
processes to 
benefit from 
design 
“We spent a lot of time working out what [the ‘customer centred design 
process’] would mean and how we would adapt our process to that sort of 
design focus and create a different life cycle stages” (head of service 
management, Company E). 
 Reliance on 
clear 
processes 
“It’s very important to have a process, because it gives everyone a 
common understanding of the goal at the time of it. I think that is the base 
of the conversation” (senior designer, Company I). 
“People only see processes as being bureaucracy when the end result to 
them is a constraint … But when actually [they] contribute to a very clear 
customer focus in terms of the end to end design, then actually everyone 
has a common purpose there which is design the best outcome for 
customers. And I think that's really influenced how we design things” 
(head of service management, Company E). 
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Under- or 
over-
formalization 
Belief that 
formal 
processes 
constrain 
creativity 
“People don't like the word process [in this company]; it's a little bit of a 
cowboy culture, it has always been like that... there is a bit of a fear to 
come up with processes and things like that. People think it will take the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the culture away.” (design manager 1, Company 
A). 
 Introduction 
of overly 
formal 
processes 
“We fired the previous Ideas and Innovation Director who, within about 
three months, actually came up with a 50-page document. So, there’s a 
moral there.” (senior project manager, Company H). 
 
 
Table 4. Occurrence and influence of identified practices in the selected companies 
Practice A B C D E F G H I J K L 
Top management 
support 
- - + + + + + + + + + + 
Leadership of the 
design function 
- - + + -  + +   + + 
Generation of 
awareness of design 
role and contribution 
- - - + - + + + + + + + 
Inter-functional 
coordination 
-   - + + +  + + +  
Evaluation of design -  - + +   +  + + + 
Formalization of 
development processes 
-  - - +  + + + +  + 
Design role (*) Serv Serv Serv S-S S-S Strat Strat S-D S-D D D D 
 
(*) Key: Serv = Service; S-S = From service to strategic; Strat = Strategic; S-D: From strategic to dominant; D = 
Dominant perspective  
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Table 5.  Practices and tensions in the elevation process 
 
Practice Inherent tension How tensions were reconciled 
Pole Opposite pole 
Top management 
support 
 
Support only initially 
and as a result poor 
management of internal 
dynamics and tensions 
with existing functions 
Excessive involvement 
and control over the 
design function’s 
operations  
Investment and continuous 
support; direct connection 
between CEO / board and design 
lead, but freedom and autonomy 
given to the design function 
Leadership of the 
design function 
Fragmentation of design 
leadership  
Design leadership is 
centralized, but overly 
controlling as the design 
director overly focuses on 
operational matters and 
fails to connect with other 
functions 
The design director leads the 
design function, understands that 
her/his main role is to influence, 
and therefore lobbies for design 
to play a more strategic role 
inside the firm 
Generating 
awareness of 
design’s role and 
contribution 
The understanding of 
design is rooted in the 
notion of ‘design as 
aesthetics’; this leads to 
low expectations over 
design’s role and 
contribution  
Expectations are not 
managed and become 
unrealistic 
Awareness of design’s broad role 
and contribution is enhanced 
through education and experience 
of what design can do, without 
expecting design to immediately 
impact the organization’s 
performance 
Inter-functional 
coordination 
Despite changes in 
policies, functions 
operate quite separately 
and there are limited 
interactions between 
them 
Excessive involvement of 
too many parties results in 
endless iterations and 
unclear decision-making 
Cross-functional teams are 
constituted at the beginning of 
projects, a healthy tension is 
created, and clear decision-
making is established 
Evaluation of 
design 
Lack of formal 
measurement is a barrier 
to providing evidence of 
design’s contribution 
Constant requests for 
evidence both at the 
beginning and during the 
development process 
overly constrain design 
Measurement is used mainly in 
the latter stages of the 
development process, results are 
evaluated at the end, and 
financial, non-financial indicators 
and proxies are considered 
Formalization of 
product and 
service 
development 
processes 
Process is too 
unstructured and does 
not provide either 
sufficient boundaries or 
clarity over how and 
what to do 
Process is mainly intended 
to provide control and 
becomes overly rigid 
Process is clearly articulated, but 
is kept flexible, especially in the 
more exploratory phases 
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Table 6: Links between elevation practices and forms of legitimacy 
Form of 
legitimacy 
Nature of elevation practices 
Pragmatic – relates 
to making the 
business case for 
design  
Top management supports the introduction and resourcing of design  
Awareness of design’s role and contribution starts to be generated 
The success of specific projects that involved design is evaluated and demonstrated 
Moral – relates to 
design being the 
right thing to do 
Leading role of the design director in championing design as a relevant but alternative 
way of operating 
Designers are part of cross-functional teams constituted at the beginning of projects 
Product and service development processes are formalized and design plays a salient role 
Cognitive – relates 
to value creation 
through design 
being taken for 
granted 
Top management support is always present  
Awareness of design’s role is constantly generated and reminded to employees  
Projects are regularly evaluated and evidence of success communicated within the firm 
Product and service development processes are formalized but kept flexible to allow 
design to play a relevant role especially in the initial phases  
 
